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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE MATTER OF
:

CaseNo.20040489-CA

:

(not incarcerated)

DAVID WEISKOPF,
A person over 18 years of age.

JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-3, (c) and (e) provide this Court's jurisdiction over this
appeal from a final order of criminal contempt entered in the juvenile court.
ISSUE, STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION
Did the juvenile court err in finding Mr. Weiskopf guilty of criminal contempt?
In reviewing contempt citations, courts review for an abuse of lawful discretion.
See Bartholomew v. Bartholomew. 548 P.2d 238, 240 (Utah 1976).
This Court reviews findings of fact for clear error, and reviews the ultimate legal
question of whether an attorney violated a duty without deference, for correctness. See.
e.g.. State v. Long, 844 P.2d 381 (Utah App. 1992).
Issues concerning the proper procedure for issuing contempt citations are reviewed
for correctness, as questions of law. See, e.g.. Barton v. Barton, 2001 UT App 199, 29
P.3dl3, 15.
The arguments presented in this brief were presented before the trial court in a
motion to reconsider (R. 35-37), and orally when the court revealed that he had decided to

reverse himself and hold Weiskopf in contempt (R. 47 at 269).
To the extent that the issues were not fully preserved, this is attributable to the trial
court's procedural errors, which deprived Weiskopf of fair notice and a fair opportunity to
be heard. Because of the plain and prejudicial nature of the errors, and the unique
procedural facts of this case, this Court could and should address all the errors regardless
of preservation under the plain error and extraordinary circumstances doctrines.1
CONTROLLING STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-1. Acts and omissions constituting contempt
The following acts or omissions in respect to a court or proceedings therein are
contempts of the authority of the court:
(1) Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge while holding
the court, tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding.
(2) Breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance, tending to

Counsel for Weiskopf believes that the issues were properly preserved. Out of an
abundance of caution, however, he asserts that the facts of this case meet the elements of
the plain error and extraordinary circumstances doctrines.
Courts utilize the extraordinary circumstances doctrine in cases involving "'rare
procedural anomalies,5" as a "'safety device'" to avoid manifest injustice. State v.
Nelson-Waggoner. 2004 UT 29, % 23, 94 P.3d 186.
The plain error doctrine requires a showing that an obvious and harmful error
occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although the obviousness
prong may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error occurred which is more obvious in
hindsight than it likely was before the trial court. See, e.g.. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d
29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), cert denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989). Constitutional errors are
particularly appropriate for correction under the plain error doctrine. See, e.g.. United
States v. Lindsay, 184 F.3d 1138, 1140 (10th Cir.\ cert, denied, 145 L.Ed.2d 343 (1999).
As is explained herein, the court's procedural errors so deviated from wellestablished constitutional norms and so prejudiced Weiskopf as to merit full relief on
appeal.
2

interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding.
(3) Misbehavior in office, or other willful neglect or violation of duty by an
attorney, counsel, clerk, sheriff, or other person appointed or elected to perform a
judicial or ministerial service.
(4) Deceit, or abuse of the process or proceedings of the court, by a party to an
action or special proceeding.
(5) Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the court.
(6) Assuming to be an officer, attorney or counselor of a court, and acting as such
without authority.
(7) Rescuing any person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an
order or process of such court.
(8) Unlawfully detaining a witness or party to an action while going to, remaining
at, or returning from, the court where the action is on the calendar for trial.
(9) Any other unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a court.
(10) Disobedience of a subpoena duly served, or refusing to be sworn or to answer
as a witness.
(11) When summoned as a juror in a court, neglecting to attend or serve as such, or
improperly conversing with a party to an action to be tried at such court, or with
any other person, concerning the merits of such action, or receiving a
communication from a party or other person in respect to it, without immediately
disclosing the same to the court.
(12) Disobedience by an inferior tribunal, magistrate or officer of the lawful
judgment, order or process of a superior court, or proceeding in an action or
special proceeding contrary to law, after such action or special proceeding is
removed from the jurisdiction of such inferior tribunal, magistrate or officer.
Disobedience of the lawful orders or process of a judicial officer is also a contempt
of the authority of such officer.

§ 78-32-3. In immediate presence of court; summary action—Without immediate
presence; procedure
When a contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence of the court, or
judge at chambers, it may be punished summarily, for which an order must be
made, reciting the facts as occurring in such immediate view and presence,
adjudging that the person proceeded against is thereby guilty of a contempt, and
3

that he be punished as prescribed in Section 78-32-10 hereof. When the contempt
is not committed in the immediate view and presence of the court or judge at
chambers, an affidavit shall be presented to the court or judge of the facts
constituting the contempt, or a statement of the facts by the referees or arbitrators
or other judicial officers.
§ 78-32-10. Contempt—Action by court
Upon the answer and evidence taken, the court shall determine whether the person
proceeded against is guilty of the contempt charged. If the court finds the person is
guilty of the contempt, the court may impose a fine not exceeding $1,000, order
the person incarcerated in the county jail not exceeding 30 days, or both. However,
a justice court judge or court commissioner may punish for contempt by a fine not
to exceed $500 or by incarceration for five days or both.
Utah Code Ann, § 76-1-403
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out of a
single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a different
offense arising out of the same criminal episode is barred if:
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should have been tried
under Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; and
(b) The former prosecution:
(i) resulted in acquittal; or
(ii) resulted in conviction; or
(iii) was improperly terminated; or
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment for the defendant that has not
been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that necessarily required a determination
inconsistent with a fact that must be established to secure conviction in the
subsequent prosecution.
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a finding of not guilty by the
trier of facts or in a determination that there was insufficient evidence to warrant
conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser included offense is an acquittal of the
greater offense even though the conviction for the lesser included offense is
subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated.
4

(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of guilt that has
not been reversed, set aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty that has not been
reversed, set aside, or vacated and that is capable of supporting a judgment; or a
plea of guilty accepted by the court.
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the termination takes place
before the verdict, is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and takes place
after a jury has been impanelled and sworn to try the defendant, or, if the jury trial
is waived, after the first witness is sworn. However, termination of prosecution is
not improper if:
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the termination;
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the termination is necessary
because:
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity with the law;
or
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not attributable to the state that would
make any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of law; or
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not attributable to the state
makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without injustice to the defendant or
the state; or
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a fair trial.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION
During the course of a joint certification hearing for two juveniles on May 11,
2004, Judge J. Mark Andrus of the Second District Juvenile Court found the conduct of
Deputy County Attorney David Weiskopf contemptuous, but informed Weiskopf that he

5

would not hold him in contempt (T. 80).2 The court signed two written orders in the
juveniles' cases reflecting that he found Weiskopf s conduct contemptuous, but that the
court would not hold him in contempt (in addendum).3
When the joint certification hearing concluded ten days later on May 21, 2004,
Judge Andrus informed Weiskopf that he had changed his mind and was holding Andrus
in contempt (R. 46 at 267). The court entered written findings reflecting that he was
prompted to hold Weiskopf in contempt as a result of Weiskopf s history of
contemptuous behavior which preceded the May 11, 2004 hearing, but the court did not
identify any such conduct by date or case number or name, or in any fashion (R. 17-18).
The court did not indicate whether all of the unspecified instances of misbehavior
occurred in or outside the presence of the court (R. 17-18).
The court set Weiskopf s sentencing for May 26, 2004, and denied Weiskopf s
motion to continue the sentencing, depriving Weiskopf of an opportunity to review the
record of the joint certification hearing to prepare to defend himself (R. 18, 40-41).
At sentencing, the court imposed a sentence of thirty days in jail and a fine of
$1,000, and then suspended all but two days of the jail time and all but $200 of the fine,
2

At the time of the writing of this brief, the district court clerk had yet to paginate
the first page of the May 11, 2004 transcript. Hence, counsel for Weiskopf refers to this
transcript as "T."
3

At the time of the writing of this brief, these two minute entries had yet to be
paginated by the clerk. Hence, counsel for Weiskopf does not cite to them by record page
number, but has included them in the addendum to his brief, after moving the Court to
include them in the record, with the stipulation of counsel for the State.
6

conditioned on Weiskopf s compliance for a year with standing orders regarding
courtroom decorum (R. 48 at 3-4).
In sentencing Weiskopf, the court complained of and relied on Weiskopf s
behaviors in other unspecified cases, without specifying whether all of these alleged
behaviors occurred inside or outside the court's presence, and acknowledged that only
two of the complained of behaviors had occurred in the joint certification hearing on May
1 lth (R. 48 at 2-3).
The court then complimented Weiskopf, indicating that the court liked the work he
did in the court. The court stated,
You work your butt off, you care about the kids, and 99 percent of
the time you're a great attorney. I would like to see that continue for a long
time. And I know that I make decisions that are tough and difficult to deal
with, I just have to make those, and I hope you can find a way to make this
work and keep doing the good things you're doing.
(R. 48 at 4).
The court entered a written "Sentence on Contempt of Court" again referring to
Weiskopf s poor behavior in past, unspecified cases (R. 38).
On June 10, 2004, counsel for Weiskopf filed a motion to reconsider and to stay
the sentence imposed pending a hearing (R. 35-37), and on June 11, 2004, counsel moved
the trial court to issue a certificate of probable cause pending appeal (R. 28-30).
The court denied the motion to reconsider and to stay the sentence on June 10,
2004 (R. 33-34).

7

Counsel for Weiskopf filed a notice of appeal (R. 14).4
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because Mr. Weiskopf did not have the benefit of a trial or an evidentiary hearing
prior to the issuance of the contempt citation, the available facts are limited, and largely
expand upon those stated in the Nature of the Case section of this brief, supra.
The appellant, David Weiskopf, is a Deputy Weber County Attorney, who was
representing the State in the Second District Juvenile Court in and for Weber County,
before Juvenile Court Judge J. Mark Andrus, in a consolidated certification hearing in In
reJLC, Case Number 135570, and In re J.O.. Case Number 935953, on May 11, 2004 (in
addendum).
During the course of that hearing, defense counsel objected to a sworn written
statement of Alex Espinosa, who was not present, and after the parties argued the
admissibility of the evidence, the court ruled that it was inadmissible (T. 74-75). The
court premised its ruling on its interpretation of a specific case, and after the court ruled,
Mr. Weiskopf pointed out that the case relied on by the court supported admitting the
statement, as did a specific statute (T. 75). The court indicated that it had made its ruling,

4

Because Weiskopf s fine was payable to the court, rather than to a party, and
because two days of the jail sentence and $200 of the fine were not suspended, the
contempt is properly characterized as criminal and appealable. See, Von Hake v.
Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1168-69 (Utah 1988) (contempt is characterized as criminal and
therefore is appealable if part of sentence is fixed and may not be purged by condemner,
and if fine it to be paid to court, rather than to a party).
8

and Mr. Weiskopf stated,
All right. The State []notes that [ruling is] in stark contrast [to the]
plain language and the definition in the code and the Court has already
shown hostility to the prosecution and we wonder why they're trying to
keep evidence out that's clearly provided for in the law.
(T. 75).
The court then stated,
Mr. Weiskopf, your statements are inappropriate. The next time that
you argue with my rulings after I've made a ruling, I will find you in
contempt of court. I'm directing you not to do that (T. 75).
Mr. Weiskopf asked for a continuance to facilitate an appeal from the court's
ruling, and the court denied the motion (T. 75-76). The court granted a recess at the
prosecution's request, and Weiskopf asked, "So you're saying we need to present Alex
Espinosa?" (T. 76). The court said that he had made his ruling, and then Weiskopf
interrupted and asked for a continuance "since the Court gave us this new slant on what a
certification" (T. 76). The court interrupted Weiskopf for the ten minute break (T. 76).
Following the break, the court made a record of his perspective of what had
occurred in chambers, stating,
Okay. I'm going to make a record of a discussion that we had in
chambers just a few moments ago. Counsel had requested to speak with the
Court in chambers and had the attorneys, Mr. Weiskopf for the State, Ms.
Sipes for Jeffrey Ortega, and Ms. Clark for Javier Cisneros in my chambers.
There was a question raised by Mr. Weiskopf regarding the ruling the Court
had just made and how it might impact future evidence that he intends to
offer and after hearing what he had to say, I indicated that I was not going
9

to re-argue the motion or the ruling there in the chambers and Mr. Weiskopf
started bringing up the issue again. I repeated that I was not going to argue
the issue there and he started bringing it up again and then I raised my voice
and said I'm not going to argue it at this point. He then turned to me and
said, "I haven't screamed at you, Judge, but you've now screamed at me
twice," and then he said, "Judge, I've had it." and then he repeated, "I've
had it" addressing those remarks to the Court.
(T. 76-77).
When the court asked if counsel disputed his recitation, one of the defense
lawyers, Ms. Sipes, said she did not dispute the court's version, but Mr. Weiskopf did
disagree. The court permitted him to record his version of what transpired, and he stated:
That when I brought up the issue of similar evidence, you said that we were
free to try and work out a stipulation but you weren't going to rehear an
argument which recognized that we were doing more than really hearing an
argument. I was trying to address with counsel and the Court an
arrangement with respect to a similar kind of evidence. So it wasn't my just
directing re-argument toward you and you specifically acknowledged that
by addressing that I was bringing up a new issue of evidence that could be
spoken about and then you characterized it as arguing and kept saying you
weren't going to reargue, the two times like you said and then I tried to
bring your attention back to this and you screamed at me and then you got
up and approached me in an angry manner and continued to scream at me
and then I turned at you and said, "You've screamed at me twice today, the
other time being when the defense counsel was almost an hour late and I
simply said I want to make a record that this is not fair, I'm unhappy. I do
not recall - does anyone recall being told this hearing may be delayed? It's
not fair to the witnesses, it's not fair to the victim." And you screamed at
me, "Well, what am I suppose to do about it" or something like that.
(T. 77-78).
The other defense lawyer, Ms. Clark, then indicated that the judge did not scream
at Mr. Weiskopf when Weiskopf complained about the tardiness of the other lawyer, but
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simply said, "Yes, it may be unfair but, you know, what can I do about it?" (T. 78).
Mr. Weiskopf noted his belief that there was a tape of that conversation (T. 78).5
Ms. Clark clarified that there was no screaming by the judge in chambers, although
the judge did raise his voice one time, as the judge had recognized (T. 78). She saw the
judge walking out with the attorneys, but did not see him move toward Mr. Weiskopf (T.
78-79).
Weiskopf then asked if the judge denied approaching Weiskopf directly as they
were leaving chambers, and the court responded,
I did not scream at you at all today either on the prior incident or at
the incident in my office. I did raise my voice once at you after I had twice
told you that I was not going to reargue the matter and told you that you
could talk that over with counsel and see if you could stipulate something
but that I was not going to reargue my ruling. I did walk toward you as
everyone was leaving the room and as I was headed in the direction as well,
but I was not approaching you in an angry manner.
(T. 79).
Defense counsel Sipes then apologized for delaying the hearing earlier in the day,
and volunteered that she did not know how the court could have left chambers without
walking around the desk that Weiskopf was standing by, and that she would not
characterize the judge as screaming or yelling at Weiskopf (T. 79-80).
The court then stated,

5

Counsel for Weiskopf had been unable to locate a tape of the proceedings before
defense counsel arrived and the joint certification hearing ensued. It apparently was not
recorded.
11

Now, I'm going to warn you again, Mr. Weiskopf, it was very
inappropriate when you made the last statement to the Court directly, "I've
had it" and then repeated that and I find that that is contemptible. I'm not
finding you in contempt of Court at this time (T. 80). Weiskopf thanked the court, and the court continued,
- but I will not put up with that. I realize these matters are emotional
and the Court may make correct or incorrect rulings and it's the duty of
counsel to take the rulings and move on.
(T. 80). The certification hearing then continued without further incident.
The court signed minute entries on May 11, 2004, in both juvenile cases reflecting
that Weiskopf s conduct was contemptuous but that the court did not find him in
contempt (in addendum). They stated,
...States exhibit D is marked, identified as a statement from Alex Espinoza,
and is not offered into evidence, counsel object. The exhibit is not received
into evidence. Attorney Weiskopf asks for a continuance. Court is in
recess. The court has had discussion in chambers with counsel. There was
a question by Mr. Weiskopf regarding the ruling the court had made. The
court indicated that it would not re-argue the issues. Mr. Weiskopf got
upset repeating "I've had it" "I've had it". The court does find Attorney
Weiskopf s conduct was contemptible, but does not find him in contempt.

(In addendum).
On May 21, 2004, after the joint juvenile certification hearing was complete, the
judge informed Weiskopf that he was changing his mind about not holding him in
contempt, and would set a sentencing hearing for that (R. 47 at 267). Weiskopf objected,
stating,
With respect to that, Your Honor, we may findings on the record
12

before [inaudible] to the contempt and you said you may - your
determination you did say you find me in contempt, there was no penalty.
So that is what the record is. I would submit that matter is closed. And for
the court to reopen it and just say you changed your mind without any new
findings on the record just appears to be vindictive towards the prosecutor.
(R. 47 at 269).
The court entered written contempt findings, which are in the addendum to this
brief. In these findings, after detailing the facts from his perspective, the court found
Weiskopf in contempt for a vastly broader range of conduct than he initially found
contemptuous (Weiskopf s twice telling the judge "I've had it." (T. 80; (in addendum)).
His ruling stated,
6. This Court finds Mr. Weiskopf in contempt of court for:
- repeatedly and rudely interrupting the Court while it was attempting
to explain its rulings;
- violating the Court's order not to argue with the Court's ruling;
- his behavior in the Court's chambers: continuing to argue with the
Court, falsely accusing the Court of screaming at him, and making the angry
statement, "Judge, I've had it. I've had it." These were attempts to get the
Court to change a prior ruling through verbal intimidation; and
- falsely accusing the Court inappropriate behavior, in an attempt to
cast the Court in a bad light and in an attempt to excuse or mitigate his own
inappropriate behavior (claiming that the Court was hostile towards the
State, that the Court had screamed at him before the hearing began, that the
Court had screamed at him in chambers, and claiming that the Court had
advanced towards him in an angry manner and screamed at him again).
The Court finds that this conduct constituted contempt of court
pursuant to Utah Code Section 78-32-1(1) and (2) as disorderly,
contemptuous, insolent, or boisterous conduct which tended to interrupt the
due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding, and that, pursuant to Utah
Code Section 78-32-1(5) he disobeyed the Court's order not to argue with
or criticize with court rulings once they had been made.
(R. 17-18).
13

The court recognized that he had originally indicated that he would not hold
Weiskopf in contempt, but explained that after reflecting on Weiskopf s failure to correct
his poor behavior in prior cases, decided to invoke the court's contempt powers (R. 18).
In discussing Weiskopf s past behavior which prompted the contempt citation, the
court alleged that he had "a pattern of rudely interrupting the court while it is making
rulings, as well as arguing and criticizing, in a very disrespectful manner, court rulings
while and after they are made," but the court did not identify any such instances by date
or case number, or in any other fashion (R. 18). Nor did the court clarify whether some of
the conduct complained of, such as the criticism of court rulings, occurred outside of the
court's presence.
The order directed Weiskopf to appear for sentencing on May 26, 2004 (R. 18).
On May 25, 2004, Weiskopf moved to continue the sentencing hearing so that he
could obtain a transcript of the May 11, 2004 hearing, which he had been unable to obtain
from the court's clerks, as a result of apparent technical difficulties (R. 41). The court
denied the continuance the same day (R. 40).
At the outset of the sentencing hearing, Mr. Weiskopf declined to say anything in
his defense, noting that he did not have an opportunity to review the record to prepare to
say anything (R. 48 at 2). Before imposing sentence the court complained of Weiskopf s
misbehavior in other unspecified cases, stating:
... I note that as was alluded to in my findings that there have been past
behaviors of inappropriate behavior before this Court, including arguing
14

with opposing counsel, telling opposing counsel to shut up, using profanity
in court to express anger or frustration as well as interrupting the Court
while its making findings or explaining its findings in the past, and arguing
with the Court about rulings which have already been made. The latter two
are things that were I found occurred in this case, they've also occurred in
the past.
Where there has been inappropriate courtroom behavior by an
attorney, some of the factors important to the Court, of course, besides the
nature of the behavior which I've addressed in my written findings is
whether there is a recognition of wrongdoing, whether there's remorse for
it, whether there's an expression of a firm intention not to repeat the
behavior, whether there is a plan for avoiding inappropriate behavior in the
future particularly where it's been a chronic problem or something that has
been repeated. Also primarily what the Court is after is to have this type of
behavior cease.
(R. 48 at 2-3).
The court then imposed a sentence of thirty days in jail and a fine of $1,000,
suspending all but two days of the jail time and all but $200 of the fine, conditioned on
Weiskopf s compliance for a year with standing orders regarding courtroom decorum (R.
48 at 3-4).
The court then complimented Weiskopf, indicating that the court liked the work he
did in the court. The court continued,
You work your butt off, you care about the kids, and 99 percent of
the time you're a great attorney. I would like to see that continue for a long
time. And I know that I make decisions that are tough and difficult to deal
with, I just have to make those, and I hope you can find a way to make this
work and keep doing the good things you're doing.
(R. 48 at 4).
The court entered a written "Sentence on Contempt of Court" making these
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additional findings:
1. Besides the inappropriate behavior which occurred during the
hearing of May 11, 2004, Mr. Weiskopf has engaged in inappropriate
behavior in the past, including arguing with opposing counsel; telling
opposing counsel to "shut up"; using profanity in court to express anger or
frustration; interrupting the Court while it is making findings or explaining
findings; and arguing with the Court about rulings which have already been
made.
2. In assessing the proper sentence for contempt of court, in addition
to the seriousness of the conduct, chronicity, and other factors, the Court
looks at whether there has been a recognition of wrong-doing, an
expression of remorse, an expression of a firm intention not to repeat the
inappropriate behavior in the future; none of these were expressed in the
current case, except that after the Court had orally announced the sentence,
Mr. Weiskopf did say that he had talked with the people in his office and
had decided to avoid those behaviors in the future, which was greatly
appreciated by the Court.
3. Mr. Weiskopf is a hard-working person who generally
demonstrates a concern for doing the right thing for juveniles who come to
juvenile court; this Court has observed those traits in Mr. Weiskopf for
several years.
(R. 38).
At the sentencing hearing referred to by the court, Weiskopf did not agree to
having a history of misbehavior, but did express his intention to work to please the court
in the future. His comments at sentencing were as follow:
Appreciate it, your Honor. And I will, you know. I think myself and
my office are committed to trying to work with the Court and satisfy the
Court so hopefully that will - . . . work out to everybody's satisfaction
down the road. I appreciate your interest that as well.
(R. 48 at 4-5).
On June 10, 2004, counsel for Weiskopf filed a motion to reconsider and to stay
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the sentence imposed pending a hearing (R. 35-37), and on June 11,2004, counsel moved
the trial court to issue a certificate of probable cause pending appeal (R. 28-30).
The court denied the motion to reconsider and to stay the sentence on June 10,
2004, reasoning that his oral statement on May 11 that he was not finding Weiskopf in
contempt was not final because it was not reduced to writing; that his oral statement only
indicated that he was not finding Weiskopf in contempt "at that time," that the court was
not required to find Weiskopf in contempt summarily on May 11; that Weiskopf got more
notice and time than he was entitled to under the relevant law; and that Weiskopf was not
entitled to the procedural benefits applicable to cases of indirect contempt, as set forth in
Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-10 (R. 33-34).
All relevant transcript pages and written rulings are in the addendum to this brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Our laws govern the issuance of contempt citations in order to insure that the
public and litigants are not abused by the inherently strong powers of the courts to control
their courtrooms and the people subject to their jurisdiction.
Summary criminal contempt powers are antithetical to our country's historical
traditions of due process of law, and are thus to be used sparingly, in cases wherein
extreme behavior in the courtroom portends to obstruct the proceedings, and requires
immediate vindication of the courts9 authority.
The facts that the judge waited ten days to hold Weiskopf in contempt, and that his
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ultimate contempt orders referred strictly to conduct which occurred on or before May 11,
demonstrates that no summary contempt procedures were necessary or properly exercised
by the juvenile court.
The misuse of quasi-summary6 contempt powers, ten days after the May 11th
conduct had occurred, and who knows how long after the unspecified instances in
Weiskopf s history of allegedly contemptuous behavior had occurred, violated due
process of law.
The judge's procedure, in reversing his final orders, in consistently and vaguely
expanding the range of conduct he initially found contemptuous, in failing to follow the
contempt statute, in denying Weiskopf an opportunity to defend against the charges, and
in sentencing Weiskopf before Weiskopf had an opportunity to review the record and
prepare to defend himself, violated rudimentary principles of due process of law.
The court's summarily finding Weiskopf in contempt for a history of unspecified
behavior, which may have involved conduct outside the court's presence, and which was
at least partially protected by the First Amendment, likewise violated fundamental tenets
of due process in this criminal case.
The juvenile court should be bound to the May 11, 2004 order by the doctrines of
law of the case and res judicata, and by the bar against double jeopardy.

6

Counsel for Weiskopf uses the term quasi-summary to distinguish the juvenile
court's ultimate contempt citation, which was meted out days after the facts without due
process, from a true summary contempt proceeding.
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This Court should reverse the trial court's order finding Weiskopf in contempt.
ARGUMENTS
I.
NO EXERCISE OF
SUMMARY CONTEMPT POWERS
WAS JUSTIFIED.
Contempt is divided into two branches: direct contempt, which is misbehavior
occurring in the presence of, and obstructing the functioning of, a court, and indirect
contempt, which is disobedience of a court order outside the court's presence. See, e.g..
Crank v. Utah Judicial Council 2001 UT 8,fflf27, 20 P.3d 307; Utah Code Ann. § 78-321 (defining various types of contemptuous conduct).
Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-3 requires courts to comply with detailed procedures in
cases of indirect contempt, and permits courts to summarily punish instances of direct
contempt. It provides,
When a contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence
of the court, or judge at chambers, it may be punished summarily, for which
an order must be made, reciting the facts as occurring in such immediate
view and presence, adjudging that the person proceeded against is thereby
guilty of a contempt, and that he be punished as prescribed in Section 7832-10 hereof. When the contempt is not committed in the immediate view
and presence of the court or judge at chambers, an affidavit shall be
presented to the court or judge of the facts constituting the contempt, or a
statement of the facts by the referees or arbitrators or other judicial officers.
The courts' authority to summarily punish contempt which occurs in their presence
in the courtroom is designed to insure that the justice system is able to function
appropriately and is not obstructed by obstreperous behavior of people in court. See, e.g..
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Pounders v. Watson. 521 U.S. 982, 987-988 (1997). For instance, the first two
subsections of Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-1, the statute which defines contemptuous
conduct, provide,
The following acts or omissions in respect to a court or proceedings
therein are contempts of the authority of the court:
(1) Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge
while holding the court, tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or
other judicial proceeding.
(2) Breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance,
tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding.

(Emphasis added).
Laws governing procedures to be followed in the issuance of contempt orders are
not designed to protect the judges. Rather, they are designed to protect the public and the
litigants from the inherently strong and otherwise unchecked powers of the courts to
control their courtrooms and the people involved in them. See In re McConnell 370 U.S.
230 (1962) (explaining that the federal contempt laws were enacted in 1831 to correct
"serious abuses" by the courts and to protect constitutional procedures). See also,
Robinson v. City Court for the City of Ogden, 185 P.2d 256, 259 (Utah 1947) (the
purpose of the contempt laws is not to protect judges as individuals; their "purpose is to
protect litigants and the public from the mischievous danger of an unfree and coerced
tribunal").
Because they are antithetical to our traditions of procedural due process, summary
contempt proceedings must be limited, and are normally reserved for misconduct in open
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courtrooms, where the court's dignity is openly affronted in public, where disruption of
ongoing proceedings is threatened, and where the circumstances thus require more
immediate vindication of the court's authority. See, generally, e.g.. Pounders v. Watson.
521 U.S. 982, 988-991 (1997).
Trial judges must use great restraint in exercising summary contempt powers. See.
InreMcConnelL 370 U.S. 230, 234 (1962). The Supreme Court has held that federal
courts must exercise the least contempt powers necessary to maintain order, lest they
encroach on the Bill of Rights. Id. In interpreting the federal contempt statute, the Court
has required proof of actual obstruction of justice to justify summary contempt
proceedings. Id.
Particularly in cases where the alleged condemner is a lawyer actively representing
a client, summary contempt powers should be used very sparingly. As the Court
explained in McConnell.
While we appreciate the necessity for a judge to have the power to
protect himself from actual obstruction in the courtroom, or even from
conduct so near to the court as actually to obstruct justice, it is also essential
to a fair administration of justice that lawyers be able to make honest goodfaith efforts to present their clients' cases. An independent judiciary and a
vigorous, independent bar are both indispensable parts of our system of
justice.
Id. at 236.
In McConnell. a lawyer was trying to make a proffer of questions necessary to
preserve his client's position on appeal, and when the judge tried to stop the lawyer, the
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lawyer asserted that he would continue to ask the necessary questions until removed from
the courtroom by the bailiffs. After a recess, the lawyer asked no further questions and
the trial continued without incident Id. at 235-36. On these facts, the Court found that
the exercise of summary contempt powers under the federal statute was not warranted,
explaining, 'The arguments of a lawyer in presenting his client's case strenuously and
persistently cannot amount to a contempt of court so long as the lawyer does not in some
way create an obstruction which blocks the judge in the performance of his judicial duty."
Id. at 236.
In the instant matter, the court initially found Weiskopf s twice saying to him in
chambers "I've had it" after referring to the court's twice "screaming" at him
"contemptible," but expressly opted not to find Weiskopf in contempt (T. 80), until he
reversed himself and held him in contempt ten days later.
The exercise of summary contempt powers was not justified, because Weiskopf s
informing the court in chambers that he could not tolerate the judge's raising his voice at
him7 did nothing to block the juvenile proceedings from going forward. Nor did
Weiskopf s attempts to inform the court of the relevant law, or to clarify how the court's
ruling would apply to similar evidence in the remainder of the proceedings. Compare
McConnell supra.
The fact that the exercise of summary contempt powers was not justified is most

7

The judge did concede that he raised his voice once in chambers (T. 79).
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clearly demonstrated by the fact that the judge so recognized during the hearing on May
11, 2004, when he informed Weiskopf that he would not hold him in contempt and signed
two written orders to this effect (T. 80, addendum), and proceeded to complete the
hearing on the 1 ltht, and only decided to hold him in contempt ten days later at the
conclusion of a two day certification hearing, which involved no misbehavior by
Weiskopf after the judge said he would not hold him in contempt on the 11th (e.g. R. 47
at 267). The contempt citation did nothing to facilitate a blocked judicial proceeding, or
to immediately vindicate the publicly disobeyed orders of a court, and was neither
justified as, nor imposed as, a true summary contempt citation. See, e.g.. Pounders v.
Watson, supra.
The juvenile court's bootstrapping of Weiskopf s allegedly contemptuous past
behavior that was unidentified by case number, date, or specific incident (e.g. R. 17-18),
does nothing to establish that Weiskopf did anything to obstruct the proceedings on May
11, 2004, or on any other day, to justify the exercise of summary contempt powers. See
McConnelL supra. Rather, it reflects that the judge decided on May 21, 2004, that he
wanted to change some of the norms of behavior that had been permitted and prevailed in
his courtroom for years, as Weiskopf had been "working his butt off," being a "great
lawyer" "ninety-nine percent of the time," caring about the juveniles coming through the
courtroom, and effectively representing his client (R. 38, R. 48 at 4). The misuse of
summary contempt powers to reach this end was flagrantly inappropriate and an abuse of
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due process. See McConnell, supra.
Because the juvenile court's invocation of summary contempt powers was neither
legally justified nor properly executed, this Court should reverse the juvenile court's
orders finding Weiskopf in contempt.
II.
THE COURT DENIED WEISKOPF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
IN THIS CRIMINAL CASE.
The courts of this State exercise two distinct types of contempt powers:
civil contempt, which is remedial and designed to persuade a party to comply with a court
order, and criminal contempt, which is designed to punish disobedience of a court order,
to vindicate the court's authority. See generally, e.g.. Foreman v. Foreman, 176 P.2d 165,
168-69 (Utah 1947). It is a court's purpose in imposing a contempt order that determines
whether the contempt is properly classified as civil or criminal, for both types of contempt
may involve fines or imprisonment. See, e.g.. Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162,
1168-69 (Utah 1988). If a court intends to vindicate its authority, the contempt is
generally viewed as criminal, whereas if a court intends to act in remedial fashion, the
contempt is generally viewed as civil. See id. When a condemner is able to purge
himself of the consequences of his contempt by complying with a court order, the
contempt is generally viewed as civil. Id. and n.5. When a condemner must serve a fixed
sentence, and pay fines to the court, rather than to a party, the contempt is viewed as
criminal. Id.
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Because two days of Weiskopf s jail sentence and two hundred dollars of
Weiskopf s fine paid to the court were not suspended, at least that part of the contempt in
this case is properly viewed as criminal. See id.
Every criminal defendant has several related federal constitutional rights to present
a complete defense to criminal charges against him. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
683 (1985)(M Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, or in the Compulsory Process of confrontation clauses of the Sixth
Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 'a meaningful opportunity
to present a complete defense.1... We break no new ground in observing that an essential
component of procedural fairness is an opportunity to be heard.,!)(citations omitted).
The Constitution of Utah provides parallel protection. An essential element of due
process provided by article I section 7 of the Utah Constitution is the "fair opportunity to
submit evidence." Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945). "[T]he
defendant's right to present all competent evidence in his defense is a right guaranteed by
the due process clause of our State Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 7[.]" State v. Harding, 635
P.2d 33, 34 (Utah 1981).
Article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides numerous trial rights which
also pertain. It states,
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear
and defend in person and by counsel to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf,
to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process
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to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense
is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases.

(Emphasis added).
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 similarly provides,
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel;
(c) To testify in his own behalf;
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf^.]
Under the Utah and Federal Constitutional Due Process Clauses, Article I § 7 and
the Fourteenth Amendment, respectively, a person facing charges of criminal contempt,
whether direct or indirect, is entitled to notice, counsel, confrontation and the an
opportunity to present a defense. See, e.g.. Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1322
(Utah 1982) (per curiam); Crank v. Utah Judicial Council 2001 UT 8,ffif26-27, 20 P.3d
307. As the court explained in Powers v. Tavlor. 378 P.2d 519 (Utah 1963),
The essence of contempt of court is the wilful disregard or
disobedience of its orders. Inasmuch as it is punishable by the traditional
criminal sanctions of fine and imprisonment, it partakes of the nature of
criminal proceedings and is sometimes referred to as quasi-criminal.
Because of this it is essential that the rights of one so accused be carefully
safeguarded. He must be apprised of the nature of the accusation; afforded
an opportunity to meet it; and in order to justify a finding and sentence for
contempt the proof should be clear and satisfactory that the contemner was
in violation or defiance of the court's order. When this is done it is
necessary for the court to make written findings upon the specific conduct
found to be contemptuous, and draw its conclusions and enter judgment
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thereon.
Id. at 520 (footnotes containing citations omitted).
To sustain a criminal contempt citation, there must be proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162,1172 (Utah 1988). When the contempt is
based on disobedience of a court order, there must be proof that the defendant knew he
was under the order, that he had the ability to comply with it, and that he intentionally did
not. See id.
Criminal contempt cases normally involve the use of an order to show cause. See,
Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44, ^ 41, 100 P.3d 1151 (trial court's initiating contempt
proceedings with order to show cause evinced intent to exercise criminal contempt
powers).
Cases involving indirect contempt, or contempt occurring outside the presence of a
court, whether civil or criminal, require the use of an affidavit detailing the alleged
contempt, and an order to show cause, followed by contempt proceedings. See Crank,
supra, 2001 UT 8 atfflf27-28.
In the instant matter, the trial court ultimately punished Weiskopf for contempt on
the basis of a history of conduct, without specifying whether all the conduct occurred in
court, or outside the court's presence (R. 18, 38, R. 48 at 2-3).
Assuming arguendo that any of Weiskopf s conduct was contemptuous, if it
occurred outside the court's presence, Weiskopf was entitled to the full procedural
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protections of the affidavit and order to show cause for indirect contempt. See Crank,
supra.
Assuming arguendo that any of Weiskopf s conduct was contemptuous, if it
occurred in the court's presence, he was entitled to notice, counsel, confrontation and a
chance to defend himself. See, Crank, Burgers, and Powers supra.
The court denied Weiskopf all of the foregoing procedural rights, in citing
Weiskopf for contempt (R. 17-18) after expressly informing him that he would not (T. 80,
May 11, 2004 orders, in addendum), in giving Weiskopf no opportunity to defend himself
before informing him that he was in contempt after all, and in denying him a continuance
so he could prepare to defend himself at the sentencing hearing (R. 40). But see Crank,
Burgers, and Powers, supra.
The fact that part of the juvenile court's basis for holding Weiskopf in contempt
was Weiskopf s criticism of past court rulings (R. 17-18) demonstrates the lawless nature
of the contempt citation, for criticism of past court rulings has been well-recognized
constitutionally protected speech for years, and does not support a contempt citation.
See, e.g., Robinson v. City Court for the City of Ogden, 185 P.2d 256, 257 (Utah 1947)
("The rule announced by the Supreme Court of the United States and by this court is that
criticism after final disposition of an action is the exercise of the right of free speech and
therefore not contemptuous.") (Citations omitted).
Because the juvenile court's contempt proceedings denied Weiskopf due process
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of law and several related constitutional rights, this Court should reverse the juvenile
court's contempt orders.
III.
THE JUVENILE COURT JUDGE
SHOULD BE BOUND BY HIS MAY 11, 2004 RULING
THAT WEISKOPF WOULD NOT BE HELD IN CONTEMPT.
The court signed minute entries on May 11, 2004, in both juvenile cases reflecting
that Weiskopf s conduct was contemptuous but that the court did not find him in
contempt (in addendum). They stated,
...States exhibit D is marked, identified as a statement from Alex Espinoza,
and is not offered into evidence, counsel object. The exhibit is not received
into evidence. Attorney Weiskopf asks for a continuance. Court is in
recess. The court has had discussion in chambers with counsel. There was
a question by Mr. Weiskopf regarding the ruling the court had made. The
court indicated that it would not re-argue the issues. Mr. Weiskopf got
upset repeating "I've had it" "I've had it". The court does find Attorney
Weiskopf s conduct was contemptible, but does not find him in contempt.

(In addendum).
While the juvenile court's ruling denying the motion to consider (R. 33) accurately
quotes the court's language at the May 11 hearing, that he opted not to find Weiskopf in
contempt "at this time" (T. 80), the ruling denying the motion to reconsider is clearly
erroneous in indicating that the order that he would not find Weiskopf in contempt was
not final because it was not reduced to writing (R. 33).
Because this finding of fact is phrased in the negative, there is no evidence to
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marshal in support of it. The two signed orders in the juveniles' cases which reflect that
the court would not hold Weiskopf in contempt for the May 11 conduct conclusively
disprove the court's finding that there was no final order reduced to writing, which is
clearly erroneous.
In entering final orders effectively acquitting Weiskopf of contempt on May 11,
2004, and in later holding Weiskopf in contempt for the very same conduct on May 21,
2004, the juvenile court violated the law of the case doctrine. The law of the case
doctrine generally holds that courts will not revisit decided issues, and is designed to
protect the courts and the parties from repeated claims and the attendant waste of judicial
resources. See, e ^ , Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1038-39 (Utah 1995).
There are three circumstances which justify deviation from the law of the case

been an intervening change of controlling authority; (2)
s has become available; or (3) when the court is
>rior decision was clearly erroneous and would work a

8

In addressing this factual error, counsel for Weiskopf acknowledges his duty to
marshal the evidence in support of each finding, and to view it in the light most favorable
to the trial court. See, e ^ , Wilson Supply Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94,121,
54P.3d 1177.
In pointing out the complete absence of evidence to marshal in support of this
finding, counsel does not shirk his duty to marshal, but casts upon the Appellee the
burden of identifying one scintilla of evidence that supports the challenged finding. See,

id. at f 22.
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Id. at 1039.
None of the exceptions to the law of the case doctrine are present in the instant
case, where there is no record whatsoever of any misconduct or other change of
circumstances or law since the May 11, 2004 ruling that Weiskopf would not be found in
contempt. Holding Weiskopf in contempt was not necessary to prevent a manifest
injustice, but rather, constituted one. See Points I and II of this brief, supra.
The court's re-visitation of the contempt issue was likewise barred by the doctrine
of res judicata. Res judicata, which is divided into two branches, issue preclusion (also
known as collateral estoppel) and claim preclusion, precludes re-litigation of previously
decided issues. See, e.g.. Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme. Inc.. 669 P.2d 873, 874-75 (Utah
1983). The doctrine is premised on efficiency and economy in requiring issues to be
resolved only once and with finality. See, e.g.. Salt Lake Citizens Congress v. Mountain
States Telephone and Telegraph. 846 P.2d 1245, 1251 (Utah 1992).
The claim preclusion branch of res judicata focuses on the cause of action litigated
between the parties or their privies, and generally forbids re-litigation of issues in a
subsequent action which were or could have been litigated in a prior action. See, e.g..
Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Com'n. 2001 UT 74, Tj 22, 34 P.3d 180.
The issue preclusion or collateral estoppel branch of res judicata involves different
causes of action, but prevents parties or privies from re-litigating facts and issues resolved
in prior actions. See, id.
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To invoke the doctrine of issue preclusion or collateral estoppel, a party must
establish four elements:
(1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical to the one
presented in the instant action; (2) the party against whom issue preclusion
is asserted was a party, or in privity with a party, to the prior adjudication;
(3) the issue in the first action was completely, folly, and fairly litigated;
and (4) the first suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
Bucknerv.Kennard, 2004 UT 78, f 13, 2004 WL 2072540.
To establish claim preclusion, a party must establish three elements:
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the
claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit
or must be one that could and should have been raised in the first action.
Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
Youren v. Tintic School District, 2004 UT App 33, f 2, 86 P.3d 771.
In the instant matter, the issue and claim of Weiskopf s contempt was conclusively
and finally resolved in the final written orders of May 11, 2004, entered by Judge Andrus
and holding that Weiskopf would not be held in contempt. The judge had all the relevant
information on May 11th that he relied on in imposing the contempt order on May 21st,
and should not be heard to complain of any procedural unfairness to him in the May 11th
proceeding. Thus, the May 21st contempt order should be viewed as barred by the
doctrine of res judicata. See, e.g.. Mountain States Telephone, supra.
Particularly because the order at issue is a criminal sentence, the May 21st order
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should be stricken, because it conflicts with the constitutional and related statutory bars
against double jeopardy.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I § 12 of the
Utah Constitution both contain Double Jeopardy Clauses, which provide "a fundamental
right which prevents a defendant from being tried more than once for the same crime."
State v. Straden 902 P.2d 638, 642 (Utah App.), cert denied, 916 P.2d 909 (1996).
Similar but broader protection is provided by Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403, which
provides, in relevant part:
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses
arising out of a single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the
same or a different offense arising out of the same criminal episode is
barred if:
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that
was or should have been tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2)
in the former prosecution; and
(b) The former prosecution:
(I) resulted in acquittal; or
(ii) resulted in conviction; or
(iv) was terminated by a final order or
judgment for the defendant that has not been
reversed, set aside, or vacated and that
necessarily required a determination
inconsistent with a fact that must be established
to secure conviction in the subsequent
prosecution.
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a finding of not
guilty by the trier of facts or in a determination that there was insufficient
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evidence to warrant conviction....
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of
guilt that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty that
has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that is capable of supporting
a judgment; or a plea of guilty accepted by the court.
For purposes of double jeopardy, a judge need not label a ruling as an acquittal for
it to operate as one; if the judge makes a factual finding favoring the defendant on one or
more elements of a criminal offense, this operates as an acquittal. See, e.g.. Salt Lake
City v.Roberts, 2003 UT App 271,12, 76 P.3d 213.
In the instant matter, the judge's May 11 2004 order finding Weiskopf s conduct
"contemptible" but opting not to hold him in contempt can be viewed as an acquittal,
because the judge signed final orders expressly not holding Weiskopf in contempt, and
imposed no sentence for contempt. His ruling, finding that Weiskopf would not be held
in contempt, favors Weiskopf on all elements of a contempt charge, and thus constitutes
an acquittal under Roberts.
Alternatively, the judge's finding that Weiskopf s conduct was "contemptible"
might also be viewed as a conviction for which the judge opted to impose a sentence
involving no punishment. If so, the judge nonetheless had no business retrying Weiskopf
for that offense after entering a conviction. See, e.g., Strader, 76-1-403(3), supra.
Compare State v. Wright 904 P.2d 1101, 1102 (Utah 1995) (trial court's final written
order imposing a more severe sentence than non-final oral comments did not violate

34

double jeopardy).
Finally, the judge's finding his conduct "contemptible," followed by his final
written orders that he would not find Weiskopf guilty of contempt might be construed as a
termination by a final order determining a fact inconsistent with the subsequent
prosecution, under 76-1-403 (l)(b)(iv), supra.
Because the judge's orders finding Weiskopf in contempt violated the law of the
case, res judicata and double jeopardy doctrines, this Court should reverse those orders.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the district court's orders finding Weiskopf in contempt.
Respectfully submitted this ^«3*"dav o f c ) e c ^ m V » »o/v 2004.

\>AM~&
D. Gilbert Athay
Counsel for Mr. Weiskopf
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ADDENDUM

MAY 11 HEARING TRANSCRIPT PAGES

preliminary hearing part of this was waived.
certification hearing.

This is a

State v. DNZ talks about reports that

are required, at least at the time and I think still are
required to be submitted by statute.
MR. WEISKOPF:

And other materials.

It specifically

says written reports and other materials - and other materials
I would highlight, citing the statute 78-3A-6035 and the court
can say it's not a preliminary hearing but the expressed
specific language of the statute, 78-3A-6032, if the Court
would refer itself to the statute, says that it is a
preliminary hearing and that it has subparagraph A or 1 for
probably cause and 2 or B for the certification factors.
That's the statutory definition.
THE COURT:

Okay, I've made my ruling.

MR. WEISKOPF:

All right.

The State denotes that in

stark contrast and plain language and the definition in the
code and the Court has already shown hostility toward
prosecution and we wonder why they're trying to keep evidence
out that's clearly provided for in the law.
THE COURT:
inappropriate.

Mr. Weiskopf, your statements are

The next time that you argue with my rulings

after I've made a ruling, I will find you in contempt of court.
I'm directing you not to do that—
MR. WEISKOPF:

We'd ask to be allowed (inaudible) an

appeal on this issue and a continuance for the purpose of doing
75

1

that appeal.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. WEISKOPF:

4

Denied.

page Detective Scott?

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. WEISKOPF:

7

Yes.

THE COURT:

9

MR. WEISKOPF:

So you're saying we need to present

I've made my ruling on the - I've denied-!
We'd ask for a continuance since the

THE COURT:

I'm taking a 10-minute break, so let's

take a break.

13

(Whereupon a recess was taken)

14

THE COURT:

15

COURT CLERK:

16

|

Court gave us this new slant on what a certification —

11
12

Let's take about a 10 minute break.

Alex Espinoza?

8

10

Would you - can we have a recess to

Are we on the record?
We're waiting for the juveniles, Your

Honor

17

THE COURT:

Okay.

I'm going to make a record of a

18

discussion that we had in chambers just a few moments ago.

19

Counsel had requested to speak with the Court in chambers and

20

had the attorneys, Mr. Weiskopf for the State, Ms. Sipes for

21

Jeffrey Ortega, and Ms. Clark for Javier Cisneros in my

22

chambers.

23

regarding the ruling the Court had just made and how it might

24

impact future evidence that he intends to offer and after

25

hearing what he had to say, I indicated that I was not going to

There was a question raised by Mr. Weiskopf
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1

re-argue the mot ion or the ruling there in the chambers and Mr.

2

Weiskopf started br inging up the issue again.

3

I was not going to argue the issue\ there and he started

4

bringing it up again and then I raised my voice and said I'm

5

not going to argue it at this point.

6

said, "I haven't screamed at you, Judge, but you've now

7

screamed at me twice," and then he said, "Judge, I've had it."

8

And then he repeated, "I've had it" addressing those remarks to

9

the Court.

that as an accurate statement of what happened in chambers?

12

MR. WEISKOPF:

13

MS. SIPES: No, Your Honor.

14

THE COURT:

15

He then turned to me and

First I want to know if any of the counsel dispute

10
11

I repeated that

The State does, Your Honor.

You may put your statement on the record

of your version.
MR. WEISKOPF:

16

That when I brought up the issue of

17

similar evidence, you said that we were free to try and work

18

out a stipulation but you weren't going to rehear an argument

19

which recognized that we were doing more than really hearing an

20

argument.

21

an arrangement with respect to a similar kind of evidence.

22

it wasn't my just directing re-argument toward you and you

23

specifically acknowledged that by addressing that I was

24

bringing up a new issue of evidence that could be spoken about

25

and then you characterized it as arguing and kept saying you

I was trying to address with counsel and the Court
So
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1

weren't going to reargue, the two times like you said and then

2

I tried to bring your attention back to this and you screamed

3

at me and then you got up and approached me in an angry manner

4

and continued to scream at me and then I turned at you and said

5 I "You've screamed at me twice today, the other time being when
6

the defense counsel was almost an hour late and I simply said I

7

want to make a record that this is not fair, I'm unhappy.

8

not recall - does anyone recall being told this hearing may be

9

delayed?

It's not fair to the witnesses, it's not fair to the

10

victim."

And you screamed at me, "Well, what am I suppose to

11

do about it" or something like that.

12

THE COURT:

Ms. Clark.

13

MS. CLARK:

I was present at that initial hearing

I do

14

when (inaudible) we just came in and we were discussing the

15

time of the hearing and Mr. Weiskopf said he was just

16

concerned, he wasn't going to ask for sanctions, he just had a

17

concern that there was the delay.

18

the bench.

19

you know, what can I do about it?" That was it.

All the Judge said is, "Yes, it may be unfair but,

20

MR. WEISKOPF:

21

MS. CLARK:

22 ' the Judge.

There was no screaming by

I believe there's a tape of that.

In the chambers there was no screaming by

There was a time when the Judge, as indicated,

23

raised his voice but there was no - I heard no screaming, nor

24

did I see the Judge go toward - I mean he was walking out as we

25 J all walking o u t b u t I didn't see any m o v e m e n t b y J u d g e Andrus
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1

toward Mr. Weiskopf.

2 I
3

MR. WEISKOPF:

Does the Judge deny he was approaching

me directly as we were leaving the chambers?

4 |

THE COURT:

I did not scream at you at all today

5

either on the prior incident or the incident in my office.

I

6

did raise my voice once at you after I had twice told you that

7

I was not going to reargue the matter and told you that you

8

could talk that over with counsel and see if you could

9 J stipulate something but that I was not going to reargue my
10

ruling.

I did walk toward you as everyone was leaving the room

11 I and as I was headed in the direction as well, but I was not
12
13

approaching you in an angry manner.
MS. SIPES:

Your Honor, may I just state that it was

14

my fault and I acknowledged that it was my fault that there was

15

a delay in the trial starting today.

16

district court that went longer than I had anticipated and I

17

apologized for that.

18

witnesses and the people he brought along with him.

19

I had a matter in the

I apologized to Mr. Weiskopf and to his

I, as well, was present during that hearing.

The

20

second incident that we were talking about in chambers, I don't

21

know how the Court could have gotten out of the room without

22

walking around its desk.

23

to the side of the desk that the Court had to walk around in

24

order to get out of the room and I certainly would not

25

characterize the Court's actions as going towards or leading

Mr. Weiskopf, what I saw was standing
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1

towards Mr. Weiskopf or screaming or yelling at him.

2 |

THE COURT:

Now, I'm going to warn you again, Mr.

3

Weiskopf, it was very inappropriate when you made the last

4

statement to the Court directly, "I've had it" and then

5

repeated that and I find that that is contemptible.

6

finding you in contempt of Court at this time -

7 I

MR. WEISKOPF: Thank you, Your Honor.

8

THE COURT:

{

I'm not

- but I just will not put up with that.

9

I realize these matters are emotional and the Court may make

10

correct or incorrect rulings and it's the duty of counsel to

11

take the rulings and move on.

12
13

MR. WEISKOPF:
to the State.

14

Fine.

It does pose a problem though

Can we talk about scheduling here?

THE COURT:

Let's do this.

It's 3:15.

Let's finish the evidence

15

and then if we haven't - we may need to continue this to

16

another date anyways to finish the evidence.

17

we'll address that again.

18

MR. WEISKOPF:

If we don't, then

Thank you. I did take back the

19

statement that you declined, for which you sustained the

20

objection.

21

Q

Jy

(BY MR. WEISKOPF)

So, Detective Gent returning to

22

our examination, did you learn the names of any suspects in the

23

assault on the fallen person, upon the person identified as

24

Santiago (inaudible) Vasquez?

25

A

During the investigation we spoke to numerous
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SECOND DISTRICT JUVENILE CObuT #
FOR WEBER COUNTY, STAit Vfc&Ff&PW*? CfeA of the tarife Cfcst rf At
"~
~~
—
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of
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Present' Javier Cisncros, minor; Consuda Jimmcz, mother; Luther Gaylord, uucrpreter;
Jennifer Clark, attorney for minor; David Weiskopf and Tricia Smedley, deputy county attorney;
witnesses; and Kenny Ala, probation officer
The above entitled matter having come before this court for the puipose of arraignment on
incident 037, fake alarm, contained m the petition dated March 22, 2004 and for hearing on incident
041, attempted murder, contained in the information dated March 15, 2004 and incidctil 042 motion to
certify dated March 15,
Attorney Sipes and Attorney Clark ask that Mr. Guerster, a reporter, be asked to leave.
Motion is denied. Mr. Guerster is asked not tn use names in his article, All witnesses arc sworn. The
exclusionary rule is invoked. Jessica Tapia testifies for the state. States exhibit A is marked, identified
as a picture of the victim, and received into evidence, Jario Guiternez is sworn and testifies for the
state. States Exhibit B is marked, identified as his statement given to the police, and received in to
evidence. States Exhibit C is marked identified as a metal barbell, and received into evidence.
Detective Jim Dent testifies for the state. States Exhibit D is marked, identified as a statement from
Alex Espinoza, and is not offered into evidence, counsel object The exhibit is not received into
evidence. Attorney Weiskopf asks for a continuance. Court is in recess. The court has had discussion
in chambers with counsel. There was a question by Mr. Weiskopf regarding the ruling the court had
made. The court indicated that it would not re-argue the issue. Mr. Weiskopf got uPse^efl£2l£ng
T v e had it" "I've had it". The court indicates that it finds Mr. Weiskopf s conduct < f^S^m^but
do»not find him in contempt Detective Dent continues his testimony, States Exhibit E is manied,
idenriflcd as a statement from Javier Cisneros, and is admitted into evidence. Stales Exhibit F and C
are marked as pictures of the barbell, and are admitted into evidence. Detective Tim Scott is sworn in
and testifies for the state. States Exhibit FI is marked, identified as a statement given by Jeffery Ortega,
and is received into evidence. Attorney Stpes objects to the admission of Exhibit B - overuled. Shara
Gooda testifies for the state, Scott Peterson testifies for the state. John Zizumbo is sworn and testifies
for the state. States Exhibit I is marked, identified as daily logs of activity tor Jeff Orgega from Weber
Valley Detention Center, and is received into evidence. Patrick Gooley is sworn and testifies for the
state.
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that: This matter is continued to May
21, 2004 at 11,00 a.m. for further certification hearing. The above minor is continued in detention
pending said hearing,
Dated May 11,2004
Failure to comply with the above order will result in your being found in contempt of court, the low of your
Driver's License, and/or forfeiture of any or alt of your Utah State Income Tax refund.
You have a right to appeal this matter lo the Utah Court of Appeals, Appeal must be fil^4^ffriinr5Q^ay.s
from this date.

BY TTTE COURT.
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SECOND DISTRICT JUVENILE COU*f
FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of

MINUTES, FINDINGS AND ORDER
Case Number:935953

ORTEGA, Jeffrey
A person under 18 years of age

CD:13; 1:08; R:3 PL

Present: Jeffrey Ortega, minor; Rosaiva Uribc, mother; Sharon Sipes, attorney for minor;
Cristina Bernal, interpreter; David Weiskopf and Tricia Smedley, deputy county attorney; witnesses; and
Kenny Ala probation officer
The above entitled matter having come before this court for the purpose of arraignment on
incident Oil, contempt, contained in the affidavit dated February 24, 2004, and for hearing on incident
017, attempted murder, contained in the information dated March 17» 2004 and incident 042 motion to
certify dated March 17, 2004.
Attorney Sipes and Attorney Ciark ask that Mr. Guerster, a reporter, be asked to leave. Motion
is denied. Mr. Guerster is asked not to use names in his article. All witnesses are sworn. The
exclusionary rule is invoked. Jessica Tapia testifies for the state. States exhibit A is marked, identified
as a picture of the victim, and received into evidence, Jario Guiterriez is sworn and testifies for the
state, States Exhibit B is marked, identified as his statement given to the police, and received in to
evidence. States Exhibit C is marked identified as a metal barbell, and received into evidence.
Detective Jim Dent testifies for the state. States Exhibit D is marked, identified as a statement from Alex
Kspinoza, and is not offered into evidence, counsel object. The exhibit is not received into evidence,
Attorney Weiskopf asks for a continuance. Court is in recess. The court has had discussion in chambers
with counsel. There was a question by Mr. Weiskopf regarding the ruling the court had made. The court
indicated (hat it would not re-arguc the issue, Mr. Weiskopf got upset repeating "I've had it" "I've had
it". The court does find Attorney Weiskopf s conduct was contemptablc, but docs not find him in
contempt, Detective Dent continues his testimony. States Exhibit E is marked, identified as a statement
from Javier Cisneros, and is admitted into evidence. States Exhibit F and G are marked as pictures of
the barbell, and are admitted into evidence,
Detective Tim Scott is sworn in and testifies for the
state. States Exhibit II is marked, identified as a statement given by Jeffery Ortega, and is received into
evidence. Attorney Sipes objects to the admission of Exhibit B - overuled. Shara Gooda testifies for the
state, Scott Peterson testifies for the state. John Zizumbo is sworn and testifies for the state. States
Exhibit I is marked, identified as daily logs of activity for Jeff Orgega from Weber Valley Detention
Center, and is received into evidence. Patrick Gooley is sworn and testifies for the state.
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that: This matter is continued to May 21,
2004 at 8:00 a.m. for furtherccrtification hearing. The above minor is continued in detention pending
iuveafc Coat

J*
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1

(Whereupon a recess was taken)

2

THE COURT:

3

decide about closing arguments?

4 I
5

MS. SIPES:

We're back on the record.

What did we

I think we decided to go ahead and

proceed, Your Honor.

6

MR. WEISKOPF:

7

be enough time though, Your Honor.

8

THE COURT:

I don't know if 40 minutes is going to

Okay, if it's not enough time, let's set

9

it over to another day.

10

MR. WEISKOPF:

11

THE COURT:

I think that would be advisable.

Somewhere we've got maybe an hour and a

12 I half, two hours.
13

While she's getting that date, I have regarding my

14

ruling on May 11th when we were here last time, Mr. Weiskopf,

15

where I decided not to find you in contempt of court I changed

16

my mind.

17

want to set a sentencing date for that as well.

18
19

MR. WEISKOPF:

THE COURT:

MS. CLARK:

I'll explain that and I'll make

How much time are we looking for?

Do we

have an idea?

24
25

Yes.

written detailed findings and explain that.

22 i
23

Is there any reason you changed your

mind?

20
21

I am finding you in contempt of court for that. I

THE COURT:

I'm thinking an hour and a half to two

hours.
267

1

MS. CLARK:

2

COURT CLERK:

3

MR. WEISKOPF:

4

afternoon

Okay, thank you.
We're going to be gone [inaudible] and I have trial Thursday

[inaudible].

5

THE COURT:

Would that work for -

6

MS. CLARK:

What was the date, Your Honor, I

8 I

THE COURT:

June 1st, Tuesday.

9

MS. CLARK:

At what time?

7

apologize.

10

COURT CLERK:

11

MR. WEISKOPF:

12

COURT CLERK:

13

MS. CLARK:

Sure.

14

MS. SIPES:

I have two reviews.

15

MS. CLARK:

I have shelters, but that doesn't start

16

until 3:00.

17

1:45.
I'm sorry.
1:45.

My guess is -

So I can do -

MS. SIPES:

And my reviews I can maybe - I was

18

thinking I can handle it but it's going to be hard to find

19

time.

20

to deal with somehow.

But just so the court knows I have two of these I have

21

THE COURT:

Are they before or after?

22

MS. SIPES:

1:30 and 2:30.

23

one it's actually just the 1:30.

24

setting?

25

You know what, the 2:30

What time are you looking at

1:30?
THE COURT:

1:45.
2 6S

1

MS. SIPES:

So that may work.

I could just fly down

2

and do that other review and - and maybe I can get someone to

3

cover it.

4

fine.

I know Gary Barson [inaudible].

5 j
6

THE COURT:

So that will be

Okay, June 1st at 1:45 we will conclude

this case and do closing arguments then.

7

Get a setting for the sentencing on the contempt.

8

MR. WEISKOPF:

With respect to that, Your Honor, we

9

may findings on the record before [inaudible] to the contempt

10

and you said you may - your determination you did say you did

11

find me in contempt, there was no penalty.

12

record is.

13

court to reopen it and just say you changed your mind without

14

any new findings on the record just appears to be vindictive

15

towards the prosecutor.

I would submit that matter is closed.

16

THE COURT:

17

COURT CLERK:

18

MR. WEISKOPF:

19

So that is what the
And for the

What date can we set that disposition?
[inaudible]
But I'm formally objecting to it.

You've already made your disposition.

20

MS. CLARK:

21

supposed to be here?

22

THE COURT:

You don't need to be.

23

MS. CLARK:

Thank you.

24

THE COURT:

May 26th at 9:00 will be the sentencing

25

on the contempt.

Your Honor, is that something that we're

Okay, that'll be all for now.
269

1

MR. WEISKOPF:

Thank you.

2

MS. CLARK:

Thank you, Your Honor,

3

MS. SIPES:

Thank you.

4 |

(Whereupon the hearing was continued]

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25 ]

-c270

ORDER HOLDING WEISKOPF IN CONTEMPT

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF

CONTEMPT FINDINGS

DAVID WEISKOPF,
Case No 444959
A person over 18 years of age.

David Weiskopf, as a Deputy County Attorney for the Weber County Attorney's Office,
appeared representing the State of Utah in a hearing held May 11, 2004, on the State's motions
requesting that two separate juveniles be certified to stand trial in district court (Case Nos.
135570 and 935953, respectively). Also appearing were, the two juveniles whose cases were at
bar; parents of the juveniles; Jennifer Clark, attorney for one of the juveniles; Sharon Sipes,
attorney for the other juvenile; and Patricia Smedley, another Deputy County Attorney appearing
"for the Stater At one point during the trial, the Court made oral findings regarding behavior of
Mr. Weiskopf, indicating that the behavior was worthy of contempt of court, but that the Court
would not make a formal finding of contempt at that time; having not previously made a final
order upon the matter, and upon further reflection and consideration of the matter, the Court
hereby issues a formal finding of contempt of court by Mr. Weiskopf

FINDINGS
1. The hearing was scheduled to begin at 11:00 a.m., but Ms. Sipes, attorney for one of
the juveniles, was detained in district court on another matter; at noon, Ms. Clark, Mr. Weiskopf,
and Ms. Smedley, came into the courtroom to discuss the situation; Ms. Clark explained that Ms.
Sipes was still in district court and would still be a few minutes; Mr. Weiskopf then said Ms.
Sipes hadn't informed the court of any expected delays or conflicts; the Court's clerk indicated
that Ms. Sipes had mentioned she had a district court heanng, but had expected to be done in
time for this hearing.
Mr. Weiskopf then said he wanted it on record that he was very frustrated by this
circumstance, that the State had witnesses and was ready to proceed with the hearing, that he was
not asking for sanctions, but that he thought this was "very unfair." The Court said, "I agree with
you, Mr. Weiskopf. It is unfair, but I don't know what to do about it." (The Court's voice was at
a normal conversational level, not raised at all, and the Court's tone of voice was one of
sympathy towards Mr. Weiskopf s position ) Mr. Weiskopf then said, "I don't know what to do
about it, either." Court then indicated it would take a lunch break at that time and reconvene
court at 1:00 p.m., trusting that Ms. Sipes would be back and ready to go by that time, which she
was.

WE1SK0PF, David
Page 2

2 Duimg the couise of the certification hearing, while the Court was explaining its
ruling on an evidentiary objection, Mr Weiskopf rudely interrupted the Court, then le-aigued the
matter, criticizing the Court's ruling, after the Court reiteiated that it had made its ruling, Mr
Weiskopf again criticized the ruling, stating that the Court had "aheady shown hostility towards
the prosecution'5, the Court had not been hostile towards the state, nor were there any giounds for
concluding so
3 AA that point the Court advised Mr Weiskopf that his behavioi was mappiopnate, the
Court dnected Mr Weiskopf that he was not to continue arguing with OT criticizing court
decisions after a ruling had been made, and that if he did so, he would be found m contempt of
court, Mr Weiskopf then interrupted the Court while it was making that statement, and a
sentence or two later, after asking the Court for an explanation of its ruling, interrupted the Court
again
4 The Court then took a recess, during the recess, Mr Weiskopf requested a confeience
in chambers with counsel,~which was granted, Mr Weiskopf, along with Ms Sipes and Ms
Clark, met with the court m the Court's chambers Once m chambers, Mr Weiskopf referred to
the ruling made by the Court just before the recess (the Court had refused to admit the written
statement of a witness who was not present), and indicated that this ruling would impact the
State's plan to introduce several other documents (such as medical or doctors' statements) into
evidence without having the authors of the documents present, Mr Weiskopf said he just wanted
to know what to do m dealing with the introduction of that evidence, Mr Weiskopf then began
stating why he felt that that type of evidence should be admitted The Court indicated that it had
made its ruling and that the matter would not be re-argued m chambers
Mr Weiskopf said he just wanted to deal with the forthcoming evidence, then turned to
Ms Sipes and Ms Clark, saying he didn't know if they wanted to stipulate to that evidence
coming m, or what, he then began talking again about why that evidence should be admissible m
this kind of a hearing The Court then indicated that the issue of stipulating to evidence or not
was a matter the attorneys should discuss amongst themselves, not before the Court, and repeated
that the Court would not re-argue the pnor ruling
Mr Weiskopf then began talking about the ruling again, as all four persons were getting
up to leave the room, while getting up from its desk, the Court raised its voice and repeated that
it would not allow re-argument of the ruling and that the attorneys needed to go into the
courtroom At that point Mr Weiskopf was holding the door open as the other two lawyers
walked out and the Court, behind its desk and furthest from the door, was also heading around
the desk and towards the door

WEISKOPF, David
Page 3

Mr Weiskopf, still holding the dooi, turned back to face the Court as it approached the
door, saying angrily, "Judge, that's two times you ve screamed at me today I haven't raised my
voice at you at all, but you've screamed at me twice " The Court ttien gestured with an open
palm towards the open door and quietly said, "Please leave my chambers now " Mr Weiskopf
started out the door, but looking back at the Court, said angnly, "Judge, I've had it I've had it "
The Court kept walking, passing Mr Weiskopf at the threshold of the door, saying, "Okay, we'll
go put this on the record now " All four went into the courtroom
5 On the record Mr Weiskopf claimed that the Court had screamed at him, both earlier
m the day (referring to the incident described in paragraph #1 above, claiming that the Court had
screamed at him, "Well, what do you want me to do about it9") and m chambers, he also claimed
that, after screaming at him m chambers, the Court had advanced towards him m an angry
manner and screamed at him again None of those claims were true, and all were disputed on the
record by the Court and by the others who were present
6 The Court finds Mr Weiskopf m contempt of court for
- repeatedly and rudely interrupting the Court while it was attempting to explain
its rulings,
- violating the Court's order not to argue with the Court's rulings,
- his behavior m the Court s chambers continuing to argue with the Court, falsely
accusing the Court of screaming at him, and making the angry statement, "Judge, I've had
it I've had it" These were attempts to get the Court to change a prior ruling through
verbal intimidation, and
- falsely accusing the Court inappropriate behavior, m an attempt to cast the Court
m a bad light and m an attempt to excuse or mitigate his own inappropriate behavior
(claiming that the Court was hostile towards the State, that the Court had screamed at him
before the hearing began, that the Court had screamed al him in chambers, and claiming
that the Court had advanced towards him in an angry manner and screamed at him again)
The Court finds that this conduct constituted contempt of court pursuant to Utah Code Section
78-32-1(1) and (2) as disorderly, contemptuous, insolent, or boisterous conduct which tended to
interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding, and that, pursuant to Utah Code
Section 78-32-1(5), he disobeyed the Court's order not to argue with or criticize with court
rulings once they had been made

WEISKOPF, David
Page 4
7 The Court had initially indicated orally that it would not find contempt of court at that
time, even though Mi Weiskopf s behavioi would support such a finding, this was pursuant to
and consistent with this Court's long practice of not taking the matter of contempt of court
lightly, of being very leery of using the contempt power as a means of disciplining attorneys for
courtioom behavior, and particularly of making such decisions in the heat of an emotional
moment, choosing rather to err on the side of restraint until further deliberation is possible,
although Mr Weiskopf has engaged m contemptible behavior m the past, including a pattern of
rudely interrupting the court while it is making rulings, as v, ell as arguing and criticizing, in a
very disrespectful manner, court rulings while and after they are made, this Court has confined
itself in the past to instructing Mr Weiskopf on proper courtroom behavior, directing him not to
repeat inappropriate behavior, warning him that he would be found in contempt if such behavior
was repeated, and meeting with his employer and supervisoi to address the problem
Upon reflecting upon the matter away from the heat of the moment, this Court recognized
that those other attempts to address Mr Weiskopf s inappropriate behavior have been
unsuccessful, that it is incumbent upon this Court to address the matter more directly, and that it
is appropriate and necessary to invoke the Court's contempt power, for these reasons the Court
has deteirmned to enter these formal findings of contempt of court at this time

ORDER
This matter is set for sentencing on the contempt for Wednesday, May 26, 2004, at 9 00
a m before this Court Mr Weiskopf is to be present in court at that time The clerk is to provide
a copy of these Findings to Mr Weiskopf and to Mark Decana, Weber County Attorney
DATED THIS 21 ST DAY OF MAY, 2004
BY THE COURT
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Andrus, Judge

cc David Weiskopf, Mark Decana
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RULING DENYING CONTINUANCE

DAVID E. WEISKOPF, #7112
Deputy County Attorney
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
444 - 26th Street, 2nd Floor
Ogden, UT 84401
Telephone: (801) 626-3800
Facsimile: (801) 626-3151

MAY 2 5 2004
JUVENILE COURT
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRU-

ST ATE OF UTAH, in the interest of

ORDER GRANTING STATE'S
MOTION TO CONTINUE
SENTENCING
Case No. 444959

DAVID E. WEISKOPF

Hon. J. MARK ANDRUS

Based upon the State's foregoing Motion To Continue Sentencing, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Sentencing scheduled to be heard on May 26,
2004, at 9:00 A. M. be continued to

DATED this

dayM May, 2004.
BY THE COURT:

HON. J. MARK ANDRUS
Second District Juvenile Court

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

day of May, 2004,1 mailed/faxed/delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER

GRANTING STATE'S MOTION TO CONTINUE SENTENCING to the followingWeber County Attorney
Court Cleric

SENTENCING TRANSCRIPT
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P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:
Weiskopf.

Okay.

This is in the matter of David

The Court made prior contempt findings and those

are in writing.

This is the sentencing for that contempt

finding.
Mr. Weiskopf, did you have anything that you wanted to
say or present to the Court?
MR. WEISKOPF:

Not at this time, your Honor.

I did

want to review the record but didn't have an opportunity as
the Court well knows so Ifm not really prepared to say
anything at this time.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

The Court has indicated the written

findings have already been made available.

I've already made

the findings as to what happened in this case.

I note that

as was alluded to in my findings that there have been past
behaviors of inappropriate behavior before this Court,
including arguing with opposing counsel, telling opposing
counsel to shut up, using profanity in court to express anger
or frustration as well as interrupting the Court while its
making findings or explaining its findings in the past, and
arguing with the Court about rulings which have already been
made.

The latter two are things that were I found occurred

in this case, they've also occurred in the past.
Where there has been inappropriate courtroom behavior by
an attorney, some of the factors important to the Court, of
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course, besides the nature of the behavior which I!ve
addressed in my written findings is whether there is a
recognition of wrongdoing, whether there's remorse for it,
whether there's an expression of a firm intention not to
repeat the behavior, whether there is a plan for avoiding
inappropriate behavior in the future particularly where it's
been a chronic problem or something that has been repeated.
Also primarily what the Court is after is to have this type
of behavior cease.

Here's what I will do in this case —

MR. WEISKOPF:
THE COURT:

No.

MR. WEISKOPF:
THE COURT:
I will have —

Do you want me to stand, your Honor?
You can remain seated.

Okay.

It will be 30 days in jail, $1,000 fine,

two of these days will be forthwith.

Two

hundred of the fine will be paid by 60 days from today.

The

other $800 fine will be suspended and the 28 days in jail
will be stayed on a day-to-day basis.

I'll have standing

orders that you are to obey all court orders and directions
in the future.

You're not to interrupt the Court when it's

speaking without permission.

Permission can be gained by

raising your hand or standing and then waiting to be
recognized by the Court.

You're under a standing order not

to argue with the Court about a ruling after the ruling has
been made and to not speak rudely to the Court, other
counsel, other witnesses or other litigants and to not use

4

profanity in the court.
I would intend to use the stayed jail time lift stays for
violations for these or similar type orders in the future.
This order will be in effect for one year, in other words,
the stayed and suspended matters will be in effect for one
year, and you have a right to appeal this.

You have to file

the appeal within 30 days.
MR. WEISKOPF:
THE COURT:

Thank you.

I don't know what your plans are for the

future but I like the work you do in this court.
MR. WEISKOPF:
THE COURT:

Thank you.

You work your butt off, you care about

the kids, and 99 percent of the time you!re a great attorney.
I would like to see that continue for a long time.

And I

know that I make decisions that are tough and difficult and
hard to deal with, I just have to make those, and I hope that
you can find a way to make this work and keep doing the good
things that youfre doing.
MR. WEISKOPF:
will, you know.

Appreciate it, your Honor.

And I

I think myself and my office are committed

to trying to work with the ,Court and satisfy the Court so
hopefully that will —
THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. WEISKOPF:

—

work out to everybody's

satisfaction down the road.

I appreciate your interest in

RULING ON SENTENCING

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF

j SENTENCE ON CONTEMPT OF COURT

DAVID WEISKOPF,

|

Case No: 444959

A person over 18 years of age.

j

CD#: 15 Time#: 904 R#: 1/kl

On May 21,2004 this Court found David Weiskopf, a Deputy County Attorney for the Weber
County Attorney's Office, in contempt of court for behavior which occurred on May 11, 2004, and
for which detailed, written factual findings were made; the sentencing on the contempt was set for
this day, May 26,2004, at 9:00 a.m., at which time Mr. Weiskopf appeared; Mr. Weiskopf was given
an opportunity to make a statement or be heard prior to imposition of sentence, but declined to do
so.
FINDINGS
Having considered the matter, the Court, in addition to the factual Contempt Findings
previously issued, makes additional findings relating to the imposition of sentence:
1. Besides the inappropriate behavior which occurred during the hearing of May 11, 2004,
Mr. Weiskopf has engaged in inappropriate behavior in the past, including arguing with opposing
counsel; telling opposing counsel to "shut up"; using profanity in court to express his anger or
frustration; interrupting the Court while it is making findings or explaining findings; and arguing
with the Court about rulings which have already been made.
2. In assessing the proper sentence for contempt of court, in addition to the seriousness of
the conduct, chronicity, and other factors, the Court looks at whether there has been a recognition
of wrong-doing, an expression of remorse, an expression of a firm intention not to repeat the
behavior, and (particularly for a chronic problem) whether or not there is a plan for avoiding the
inappropriate behavior in the future; none of these were expressed in the current case, except that,
after the Court had orally announced the sentence, Mr. Weiskopf did say that he had talked with the
people in his office and had decided to avoid those behaviors in the future, which was greatly
appreciated by the Court.
3. Mr. Weiskopf is a hard-working person who generally demonstrates a concern for doing
the right thing for the juveniles who come to juvenile court; this Court has observed those traits in
Mr. Weiskopf for several years.
The Court makes the following:
CONTINUED ON PAGE 2
MAY 26, 2004

WEISKOPF, David #444959
PAGE 2 OF 2
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: Mr. Weiskopf is committed to 30 days
in the Weber County Jail, two days to be served beginning at 6:00 p.m. on June 11, 2004 until 5:00
p.m. on June 13, 2004; the remaining 28 days are stayed on a day-to-day basis; $1000 fine, $200 to
be paid by July 26, 2004; the remaining $800 are suspended on the condition that he comply with
the orders of the Court. Mr. Weiskopf is under a standing order to: obey all court orders and
directions; not interrupt the Court when it is speaking without obtaining permission (which may be
obtained by standing or by raising his hand and waiting to be recognized); not argue with a court
ruling after it has been made; not speak rudely to the Court, counsel, witnesses, or litigants; and not
use profanity in court. These conditions will be in effect for one year from today's date, and the
intention of the Court would be that part or all of the stayed jail time would be lifted upon violation
of a standing order. The clerk is to provide a copy of this order
to Mr. Weiskopf and to Mark
Decaria, Weber County Attorney.
This order may be appealed; an appeal must be filed within 30 days.
DATED THIS 26 T H DAY OF MAY, 2004.
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ORDER DENYING MOTION TO RECONSIDER

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF

RULING ON MOTION TO RECONSIDER
AND TO STAY SENTENCE

WEISKOPF, David

Case No.

444959

A person over 18 years of age.

David Weiskopf, by and through his attorney, D. Gilbert Athay, has moved the Court to
reconsider its contempt order and sentence in the above-entitled matter. Said motion is denied
for the following reasons:
Mr. Weiskopf alleges that the Court's oral statement on May 11th constituted a full and
complete resolution of the matter before the Court, and therefore the matter was concluded and
was final, and that the Court's later findings should be barred by double jeopardy. A court's oral
statement does not become a final resolution of the matter unless and until it is reduced to writing
in a final order; furthermore, even the Court's oral statement on May 11th was that, although Mr.
Weiskopf s conduct was worthy of contempt, the Court was not making a finding of contempt
"at that time"; there was one final finding and order regarding the contempt.
Mr. Weiskopf asserts that the language of Utah Code Section 78-32-3 that contempt
committed in the immediate view and presence of the court "may be punished summarily"
requires the court to either punish the matter summarily or not at all. This is not the case. The
language "may be punished summarily" is clearly permissive; what the court can do summarily,
it can also do with deliberation. It is always preferable, when possible, for a court to have the
option to ponder and deliberate before making a decision, rather than being required to act in
haste; the permissive language of 78-32-3 is consistent with that principle.
Mr. Weiskopf contends that a contempt finding made pursuant to 78-32-3 must be done
according to the procedure outlined in 78-32-10. This is also not the case. Section 78-32-3
describes the procedure for a contempt committed in the immediate view and presence of the
court, while Sections 78-32-4 through 10 describe the procedure for a contempt not committed in
the immediate view and presence of the court. In the case at bar, the contempt was committed in
the immediate view and presence of the court, and was appropriately conducted pursuant to 7832-3. The fact that the Court set the sentencing over to another day and thereby gave Mr.
Weiskopf more time and notice than that to which he was entitled, changes neither the nature of
the contempt nor the procedure to be followed.

RULING CONTD:
WEISKOPF, David
JUNE 10,2004
PAGE 2 OF 2

There has been no showing of grounds for reversing the Court's finding of contempt, nor
for staying the execution of the sentence.
This Court's prior orders are continued in effect.

DATED THIS 10th DAY OF JUNE, 2004.
BY THE COURT
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